Armonk, NY: M. Sharpe, The only English-language book dedicated to Legalism as a whole, written by a former Chinese political prisoner. Unfortunately does not engage with other literature on Legalism. The most interesting chapters deal with the influence of Legalism on the later imperial state and its relationship to the Marxism-Leninism of the 20th century. Graham, A.
Chicago: Open Court, A History of Chinese Political Thought. Translated by Frederick W. Excellent work of intellectual history including discussions of the various Legalist thinkers throughout. Particularly useful in relating the ideas of these thinkers to those of others in their intellectual milieu.
Taibei: Lianjing chubanshe, []. Shenyang, China: Liaoning jiaoyu chubanshe, Analysis of the development of this scholarship is done from a Marxist perspective.
Hangzhou, China: Zhejiang renmin chubanshe, Schwartz, Benjamin I. The World of Thought in Ancient China. Cambridge, MA: Belknap, Excellent study of the main Legalist thinkers that analyzes the development of ideas and foci, as well as their relationship with Confucianism, Mohism, Daoism, and the School of Names.
Carefully distinguishes between the ideas of each of the thinkers he addresses. Xu Zhen Zhou. The Book of Lord Shang but not Han Feizi allowed for the possibility that in the future the need for excessive reliance on coercion would end and a milder, morality-driven political structure would evolve, but these utopian digressions are of minor importance in the text Pines a.
What matters is the bottom line: radical reforms were inevitable in the past; and they are inevitable in the present.
The second pillar of Legalist political philosophy is their view of human nature. Legalists eschew the discussion of whether or not human badness or goodness are inborn, or whether or not all humans possess fundamentally similar qualities.
Shang Yang explains how to attain this:. Yet they brave what they consider bitter and perform what they consider dangerous because of the calculation [of a name and benefit].
The entire sociopolitical system advocated by Shang Yang can be seen as the realization of this recommendation Pines b. Yet in marked distinction from Xunzi and from other Confucian thinkers, the Legalists dismissed the possibility that the elite—rulers and ministers alike—would be able to overcome their selfishness. For the Legalists, it was equally axiomatic that this cannot be the case. Shen Dao explains:.
Among the people, everybody acts for himself. If you [try to] alter them and cause them to act for you, then there will be none whom you can attain and employ. Employ the people for their own [interests], do not employ them for your sake: then there will be none whom you cannot make use of Shenzi, 24—25; Harris Shen Dao dismisses the possibility that the ministers will be driven by moral commitment; on the contrary, such exceptional individuals should not be employed at all.
This sentiment recurs in Han Feizi , a text that expresses with utmost clarity its belief that every member of the elite—like any member of society—pursues his own interests cf. Goldin 58—65; Proper administrative system should not be based on trust and respect for ministers; rather they should be tightly controlled.
A political system that presupposes human selfishness is the only viable political system. Elsewhere, the text specifies:. In the past, those who were able to regulate All-under-Heaven first had to regulate their own people; those who were able to overcome the enemy had first to overcome their own people. The root of overcoming the people is controlling the people as the metalworker controls metal and the potter clay.
When the roots are not firm, the people will be like flying birds and running animals: Who will then be able to regulate them? The root of the people is law.
Hence, those who excel at orderly rule block the people with law; then a [good] name and lands can be attained. Shang jun shu ; Book of Lord Shang Moreover, to overawe the people, the text advocates inflicting heavy punishments for even petty offenses, as only then will the people be sufficiently scared as to behave properly.
Eventually, harsh punishments will eliminate the very need for punishments:. To prevent wrongdoing and stop transgressions, nothing is better than making punishments heavy.
When punishments are heavy and [criminals] are inevitably captured, then the people dare not try [to break the law]. Hence, there are no penalized people in the state. Due to above pronouncements, Shang Yang gained notoriety as an advocate of oppression; but actually his attitude toward the people is much more balanced than is often imagined. The people are not just the potential enemy of the ruler: they are his major asset. Without their hard labor in the fields or their bravery on the battlefield, the state is doomed.
Yet the people will not embrace tilling and waging war just out of fear of coercion. A more complex system is needed: one that will introduce attractive positive incentives along with awe-inspiring negative ones.
Shang Yang explains:. Human beings have likes and dislikes; hence, the people can be ruled. The ruler must investigate likes and dislikes. Likes and dislikes are the root of rewards and penalties. The disposition of the people is to like ranks and emoluments and to dislike punishments and penalties.
Shang jun shu 9: 65; Book of Lord Shang 9. This system became the cornerstone of social life in Qin. The lowest ranks were distributed for military achievements, particularly decapitating enemy soldiers, or could be purchased in exchange for extra grain yields; successful rank-holders could be incorporated into the military or civilian administration and thereafter be promoted up the social ladder. Each rank granted its holder economic, social, and legal privileges; and since the ranks were not fully inheritable, the system generated considerable social mobility see details in Loewe and ; Pines et al.
This latter concern is strongly pronounced throughout the Book of Lord Shang :. The means whereby the sovereign encourages the people are offices and ranks; the means by which the state prospers are agriculture and warfare. Today the people seek offices and ranks, yet they are attainable not through agriculture and warfare but through crafty words and empty ways: this is called to exhaust the people.
Shang jun shu 3: 20; Book of Lord Shang 3. The text insists repeatedly that the only way to make agriculture and warfare attractive is to prevent any alternative route toward enrichment and empowerment. Any group which tries to bypass engagement in agriculture and warfare—be these merchants who amass riches without tilling or talkative intellectuals who seek promotion without contributing to the state economically or militarily—should be suppressed or at least squeezed out of profits.
Nothing—neither learning, nor commerce, nor even artisanship—should distract the people from farming and making war. The text summarizes:. Hence, my teaching causes those among the people who seek benefits to gain them nowhere else but in tilling and those who want to avoid harm to escape nowhere but to war.
Within the borders, everyone among the people first devotes himself to tilling and warfare and only then obtains whatever pleases him. Hence, though the territory is small, grain is plenty, and though the people are few, the army is powerful.
He who is able to implement these two within the borders will accomplish the way of Hegemon and Monarch. To rule and control the people effectively, the government should rely on an extensive bureaucracy; but this bureaucracy in turn should be properly staffed and tightly monitored. Their strongly pronounced suspicion of scheming ministers and selfish officials was conducive to the promulgation of impersonal means of recruitment, promotion, demotion, and performance control.
One of the primary issues that the rulers of the Warring States faced was that of recruitment into government service. During the aristocratic Springs-and-Autumns period, the overwhelming majority of officials were scions of hereditary ministerial lineages; only exceptionally could outsiders join the government.
This widespread practice was deeply resented by the Legalists. When you hear his words, you consider him able; when you ask his partisans, they approve it.
Hence, one is ennobled before one has any merits; one is punished before one has committed a crime. Shang jun shu —; Book of Lord Shang Shen Dao further warns the ruler that if he decides on promotions and demotions on the basis of his personal impression, this will cause inflated expectations or excessive resentment among his servants:.
If this is the case, then even if rewards are appropriate, the expectations are insatiable; even if the punishments are appropriate, lenience is sought ceaselessly. If the ruler abandons the standard and relies on his heart to decide upon the degree [of awards and punishments], then identical merits will be rewarded differently, and identical crimes will be punished differently.
It is from this that resentment arises. Shenzi , 52; Harris An alternative will be a set of clear impersonal rules that will regulate recruitment and promotion of officials.
For Shang Yang, recruitment will be based on the ranks of merit. Han Fei remains doubtful about these: after all, why should valiant soldiers who gained ranks of merit become good officials? Han Fei himself does not solve the problem of initial recruitment but develops ways to monitor subsequent promotion of an official:. Thus, as for the officials of an enlightened ruler: chief ministers and chancellors must rise from among local officials; valiant generals must rise from among the ranks.
One who has merit should be awarded: then ranks and emoluments are bountiful and they are ever more encouraging; one who is promoted and ascends to higher positions, his official responsibilities increase, and he performs his tasks ever more orderly. When ranks and emoluments are great, while official responsibilities are dealt with in an orderly way—this is the Way of the Monarch.
Han Feizi This objective process of promotion according to measurable and objective merits became one of the hallmarks of the Chinese administrative system throughout the imperial era and beyond. Rewards and punishments primarily promotion and demotion are the major handles through which the ruler has to control his officials.
But how to judge their performance? Performance and title refers to statements and tasks. The minister presents his statement; the ruler assigns him tasks according to his statement, and evaluates his merits exclusively according to the task. When the merit is in accordance with the task, and the task is in accordance with the statement, then [the minister] is awarded; when the merit is not in accordance with the task, and the task is not in accordance with the statement, then he is punished.
Han Feizi 7: 40— This latter point is of particular importance to the Legalists. Both terms are similar to fa but are narrower in their meaning, referring primarily to a variety of means through which the ruler controls his officials. This is what the ruler should hold. Yet amid the strong emphasis on the power of techniques, rules, laws, and regulations, we can discover the sober realization that even these are not always enough, and that a perfect administrative system simply cannot come into existence.
Thus, in one of the later chapters of the Book of Lord Shang it is said:. Nowadays, [the ruler] relies on many officials and numerous clerks; to monitor them he establishes assistants and supervisors.
Assistants are installed and supervisors are established to prohibit [officials] from pursuing [personal] profit; yet assistants and supervisors also seek profit, so how they will able to prohibit each other? Insofar as techniques and rules are implemented by self-interested—or simply erring—human beings, the question remains: to what extent can the impersonal mode of rule cure the intrinsic maladies of the bureaucratic system cf.
Van Norden ? This evaluation should be qualified, though. Rather, their distinctiveness was in their pronounced anti-ministerial stance. This stance is exemplified by the following saying of Shen Buhai:. Now the reason why a ruler builds lofty inner walls and outer walls, looks carefully to the barring of doors and gates, is [to prepare against] the coming of invaders and bandits.
But one who murders the ruler and takes his state does not necessarily climb over difficult walls and batter in barred doors and gates. Creel , translation modified. This warning epitomizes what may be considered the major dividing line between Legalists and their opponents. Despite their pronounced belief in monarchic form of rule, most thinkers of the Warring States period insisted that the monarch would never succeed without a worthy aide.
Their common desideratum was attaining harmonious relations between the ministers and the rulers; not coincidentally, the common simile of these relations was that of friends, i. One of the most radical manifestations of this pro-ministerial mindset of the Warring States era was the idea of abdication, according to which a good ruler may consider yielding the throne to his meritorious aide Allan ; Pines For Legalists, in contrast, this very idea proved that the pro-ministerial discourse of their rivals was usurpation in disguise.
They added a few new dimensions to this overarching monarchistic discourse. Goldin 3—4. As such, his power is conceived not as the means of personal enjoyment but as the common interest of his subjects. Shen Dao elaborates:. In antiquity, the Son of Heaven was established and esteemed not in order to benefit the single person. Hence the Son of Heaven is established for the sake of All under Heaven, it is not that All under Heaven is established for the sake of the Son of Heaven….
Even if the law is bad, it is better than absence of laws; thereby the hearts of the people are unified. Shenzi , 16; Harris Shen Dao presents his political credo with rare clarity. Ten different moulds were used for the faces, which were then personalised by adding clay details so that each face was different from the others. The term is also used to refer to the natural brownish orange color of most terracotta. Begin typing your search term above and press enter to search.
Press ESC to cancel. Skip to content Home Essay Why was legalism important in China? Ben Davis May 8, Why was legalism important in China? How does legalism affect China? Why is legalism bad? Is legalism a religion? How did legalism begin? Where was legalism created? Is China a legalist? What are the two handles? Who gave Han Feizi a government job? Who is the emperor of the Qin Dynasty? What weakened the Han Dynasty?
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